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Abstract
We study formation of ostracism in a society from a game theoretical perspective. The dynamics of group formation is
complicated in that the choices of the individuals and the form of the groups mutually affect each other in the process. A
suggested simple model shows that individual efforts to increase his/her own sense of belonging is responsible for both
growth of groups and creation of an outcast. Once a person happens to get behind in synchronizing with others, tendency
to alienate him may grow among others, possibly making him left out in the end. Alienating minority occurs even when
there is a penalty for disliking and people are encouraged to favor others. Considering that the target is accidentally picked,
we can understand ostracism as an inherent part of the group formation, rather than a result of specific discrepancy among
people. Another finding is that a single individual who seeks for unconditional unification of the society (‘‘philanthropist’’)
likely invites his/her own isolation from the society, while the existence of such person generally promotes coalition of
others.
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Introduction
Alienation of an outcast is a pervasive and persistent phenom-
enon in social sphere of life. Ostracism, or social rejection, have
devastating results on both individual and social welfare in the
long run. For example, neurological research shows that social
exclusion activates responses analogous to pain responses associ-
ated with physical injury [1,2].
Ostracised minorities throughout history have included almost
every imaginable group of people differing in genders, religions,
races, nations, or political beliefs. However, in a daily life,
outcasting is often triggered by trifling matters and a victim may be
picked without a particular reason [3]. This suggests that creation
of ostracism reflects an inherent aspect of group formation.
Group formation is one of the important economic problems
such as resource management, cartel coalition and political
lobbying [4]. In various situations, individuals organize themselves
in communities to maximize their utilities. Figure 1 illustrates some
typical group formations: starting from arbitrary configuration (a),
people may organize a couple of similar-sized groups like (b), or
sometimes merge into a large group, ostracising one like (c).
There is an extensive body of modeling work on the group
formations in the context of both the game theory and the network
theory, [5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12], to name a few. In most researches
related to ostracism, it is treated as a powerful tool for mitigating
free-riding [13,14]. Social exclusion is an effective means of social
punishment in that ostracised individuals cannot reap the benefits
of group efforts.
This article focuses on creation of ostracism as a part of group
formation, and develops a simple dynamic coalition model to trace
it. We argue that both group formation and outcast occurrence are
originated from individual efforts to increase his/her own sense of
belonging. Among the most powerful human motives is the desire
to form and maintain social bonds [15]. It is argued that the need
for belongingness is the need for not only maintaining social
contacts but also sharing preferences and beliefs. This is consistent
with the cooperative game theory literature [16,17,18] which has
analysed the trade-off between economies of scale and the cost of
heterogeneity in large groups.
We formulate the sense of belonging of a person as N|C,
where N denotes the size of the group that the person belongs to
and C is the congruity that the person experiences in the
corresponding group. Individuals decide to like or dislike others,
which naturally determines the group that he/she belongs to. The
congruity is basically defined as the average distance of the
person’s preference from those of the others’ in the group. People
adjust their preferences in repeated games, keeping balance
between increase of the group size and increase of the congruity
for maximum sense of belonging.
It is obvious that one of the Nash equilibria of the game is the
configuration that everyone is synchronized in liking everyone else
and therefore belongs to the one same group. However, while
people are organizing larger and larger groups, sometimes one or
two persons happen to get behind. Then people may start to
synchronize their negative attitudes toward the late-joiners. Once
established, this tendency is only accelerated along group
formation, creating ostracism. It is a robust phenomenon that
frequently occurs even when there is a penalty for disliking.
In this work, we also study influence of philanthropy on group
formation. Historical review shows that philanthropy has been the
primary resource that frees civil society from purely market-driven
behavior [19]. We define a philanthropist as one who pursues
unconditional bonds with others, no matter how they differ from
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him/her. In contrast to people who conservatively and selectively
adjust their social connections to keep congruity of their groups, a
philanthropist is only interested in affecting as many people as
possible and therefore contributes to improvement of overall social
integration. However, it turned out that philanthropists unavoid-
ably expose themselves to a risk of being an outcast from the
society.
Methods
Imagine there is a set of n individuals I~fs1,s2,    ,sng,n§2.
Each individual is characterized by his/her feeling toward other
people. For simplicity we assume that there are only two types of
feeling toward each individual: friendliness and hostility. We use a
‘‘feeling vector’’ vi~(vi,1 ,vi,2 ,    ,vi,n)[Rn to express the feeling of
an individual si toward people, where vi,j represents an attitude of
si to sj . The value of vi,j is assigned as
vi,j~
a if si likes sj
{a if si does not like sj
0 if i~j,
8><
>:
with some aw0.
For each si, we naturally define the group Gi as
Gi~fsj[I Dvi,j ,vj,iw0g:
This means that Gi is the set of people who are in mutual favor
with si. We further set a group Gi~Gi|fsig including him/
herself.
People feel more intimacy when they share what they like and
what they do not with the other group members. That is, in our
setup, if they like/dislike the same people together, they feel that
their group is more integrated. This observation suggests that
congruity Ci that the individual si experiences in the group Gi can
be defined as an overall similarity between si and the members of
Gi. We set
di~
1
DGi D
X
sj[Gi
DD i{ j DD, if DGi D§1
1 if DGi D~0
8><
>:
an average distance between the feeling vector of si and those of
the group members, where DGi D is the number of the individuals in
Gi. Then the congruity of Gi is defined as Ci~1=di. Note that, if
we use a~1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
, the range of Ci is
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2n{3
p ƒCiƒ1
where the lower and upper bounds are attained when the feeling
vector of si is completely synchronized and desynchronized,
respectively, with those of other members in Gi.
Now we are ready to define a measure of a sense of belonging.
People tend to feel safe and comfortable when staying with similar
people. This implies that homogeneity of the group is a factor that
positively affects a sense of belonging. It is also natural that, under
the same level of homogeneity, the emotion is stronger when the
group size is larger. These observations enable us to define a sense
of belonging that si has in Gi as
Si~DGi DCai , ð1Þ
for some constant parameter a§0.
Note that the feeling vectors v1 ,v2 ,    ,vn completely character-
izes the current configuration and determines the group distribu-
tion, G1,G2,    ,Gn, and sense of belonging S1,S2,    ,Sn. Our
basic assumption on group formation is that each individual keeps
adjusting emotional attitudes toward others to maximize his/her
sense of belonging. To trace dynamics of group formation, we use
the best response rule: individuals, when they get a revision
chance, adopt their best possible attitude toward others (best
response) to the current configuration. This implies that an
individual si updates the feeling vector vi to, say v 0i , so that the
virtual configuration 1 , 2,    , 0i,    , n leads to maximization of
Si. For practical consideration, we assume that one changes his/
her attitude toward only one person at a time. That is, for each
i~(vi,1,vi,1,    ,vi,n), one picks just one component and switch its
value from a to {a (or the other way around). If there are more
than two possible choices for maximum, one of them is arbitrarily
selected.
The dynamical behaviour in evolutionary games generally
depends on the choice of the update rules as well. In this work, we
apply the synchronous update rule: in discrete time steps, the
whole individuals s1,s2,    ,sn adjust their feeling vectors
1, 2,    , n simultaneously according to the best response rule
mentioned above. However, it turned out that basic properties of
the system are not influenced by update rules. The simulation
results that follow in the next sections are qualitatively same for the
sequential/random update rules.
Results and Discussion
Exclusion of an Accidental Outcast
In this section, we show that individual efforts to increase their
sense of belonging lead to formation of groups, and moreover, to
Figure 1. Typical group formations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094333.g001
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frequent occurrence of ostracism. People’s preference to large and
homogeneous groups is well explained from the form of the payoff
in (1). In Figure 2, one can see a typical group formation of 30
people with the payoff functions and the update rule described in
the previous section. The graphs in the upper figure are the
evolving group sizes DGi D,i~1,2,    ,30 along this discrete time
steps upto t~1,2,    ,40. In the initial configuration at t~0, we
set the initial ratio of friendliness as low as 40% which implies that
the probability of mutual friendliness between two arbitrary
persons is 0:16: This explains that the most group sizes are around
5 at t~0. However, initiated from an arbitrary configuration,
people start to gather according to the evolutionary rule described
in Section 2 and soon melt into a large group before t~30. The
lower three figures show snapshots of two groups G1 and G15 at
t~0,10, and 30, respectively.
One of the important observations in this work is that the
individual efforts to raise the sense of belonging frequently cause
exclusion of others. Suppose that a majority of a group Gi,
including si, happen to be unfriendly to a certain outsider, say
sj ,j=i at a certain time. There are generally two possible choices
for si to increase his/her sense of belonging. Firstly, he/she can try
turning the attitude toward sj positively to have sj join Gi. This
may increase the group size, while it takes a risk of lowering the
congruity Ci. The second choice is that he may keep hating sj , in
the expectation that other people in Gi cooperate in refusing sj .
This may keep or even raise the congruity level. Once the second
tendency is established, it is only accelerated by more and more
people gathering together, eventually making sj an outcast.
Figure 3(a) illustrates typical occurrence of ostracism.
It is notable that the parameter a in (1) reflects people’s general
attitude toward group formation. Note that an individual si
update i according to the gradient of Si. Suppose aw1. Since the
congruity Ci does not exceed 1, Si increases rapidly as Ci is close
to 1: Considering the definition of the sense of belonging, this
roughly implies that people can raise their sense of belonging more
quickly by synchronizing themselves with those who are already
similar to them. In other words, people prefer to be identical with
others even if their group is not a large one. This naturally results
in a couple of non-overlapping clusterings or exclusive partitions.
You can refer to Figure 3(b).
If aƒ1, on the contrary, the Cai more sensitively reacts to the
change in the distant relations. Roughly speaking, people generally
mind if they are too far away from others. This tendency
dramatically improves social integrity and make emergence of
larger groups possible. Unfortunately, it still cannot overcome
possible occurrence of ostracism as in Figure 3(a). Especially when
Figure 2. Evolution of the group sizes (upper) and the group formation. Two exemplary groups are illustrated below. The initial ratio of
friendliness is 0.4 and the parameter a=1 is used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094333.g002
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the initial configuration of relations are badly biased to hostility,
there is a high chance of accidental creation of outcasts.
Note that the described group formation is based on synchro-
nized best response rule and therefore a deterministic process
(except when there exits multiple best choices.) In order to show
frequent occurrence of ostracism depending on the initial
configuration, Figure 4 gives some exemplary results from a
subset of the configuration space. We randomly generate the initial
feeling vectors 1, 2 ,    , 28 at t~0 such that their over all
liking:disliking ratio is 3:7. With those fixed, we vary the initial
states of two feeling vectors 29, 30: The number of the possible
states is 229&5|108. Among these, we pick arbitrary 64 for each
and trace the corresponding results. The 64|64 checker board in
Figure 4(a) is a visualization of such subset of the configuration
space. The each cell represents an initial configuration. If the
society with the corresponding initial configuration ends up in one
big group, the cell is marked white. The black cells represent initial
configurations which lead to a case of ostracism like (c). One can
see that if most people are initially biased to unfriendly attitude,
ostracism commonly occurs.
It must be noted that even when the target is picked among
those late-joiners, it is not necessarily the one who is least similar
with others in the beginning: we cannot simply expect who is going
to be an outcast from the initial size of the group. If a victim is
often accidentally picked, it suggests that ostracism can be
understood partly as an inherent property of group formation,
not solely as a result of pre-existing social inequalities.
We can also see that, despite its devastating influence, ostracism
is originated not directly from negative emotion (hate), but rather
from positive one (sense of belonging.) Moreover, this observation
is still valid even when people have a guilty of disliking others.
Considering that hate is negative emotion that consumes
psychological resource, it is natural to modify the payoff function
as
Si~DGi DCai{bhi, bw0,
where hi is the number of people that si dislikes. Addition of this
penalty encourages people to favor others. However, it turned out
that all the situations we observed in this section remain essentially
the same unless b is substantially large. The irony that ostracism
can arise even if no one is seeking it appears to have analogies with
Schelling’s segregation model [20].
Sacrifice of a Philanthropist
Suppose that there is a person who follows the payoff function
(1) with a~0: Since the payoff is not affected by congruity, the
person is only trying to grow his/her group size. In other words,
the person does not mind whether or not the people are similar to
him/her and just try to build up mutual friendships with as many
people as possible. In this regard, we can call such person with
a~0 a ‘‘philanthropist.’’
It is generally accepted that philanthropists who willingly
provide their resources with no condition play key roles in social
integrity. They help fill the gaps created by market failures and
produce social benefits. How to organize philanthropic sectors for
a large modern society has become an important issue in public
administration and political science.
Here we study influence of an single philanthropist on group
formation. Let us assume s1 to be a philanthropist with a~0 and
we set other 29 people s2,s3,    ,s30 to a~1 as usual. As
mentioned in Section 3, all people tend to conservatively and
selectively adjust their social connections when the ratio of liking
among people at t~0 is small (the initial configuration is biased to
hate.) Figure 5 depicts some statistics of the resulted group
formations according to the initial ratio of friendliness. We are
especially interested in how much influence the existence of the
philanthropist brings on the minimum size of the groups,
mG~ min
2ƒiƒ30
DGi D:
It is impressive that the philanthropist greatly contributes to
increase of the minimum group size. See Figure 5(a) for
comparison of philanthropy and no philanthropy cases. Two
graphs are generated from the Monte Carlo method with 10,000
simulations. When there is a single philanthropist, we generally
have larger mG. This implies that a philanthropist generally
prevents happening of small groups.
Figure 3. Group division according to the parameter a. The initial ratio of liking among people is 1/3. When a=1 as in (a), 30 People join
together likely making an outcast. In (b), a= 1.5 and people break into three groups of 19, 9 and 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094333.g003
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Although philanthropy promotes large group formations, it
should be noted that the most benefits are taken by the non-
philanthropists. That is, philanthropy may have a down side in
group formation, especially to whom practices it. Figure 5(b) shows
that a philanthropist unavoidably exposes him/herself to a risk of
being an outcast from the society. Here the y axis stands for the
possibility of the sole philanthropist being ended up as an outcast,
which reaches as high as 40% for the initial ratio 0:24: It is
somehow irony that individual who pursues for unconditional
friendship and help improve overall social integrity risks his/her
own social connections.
Figure 4. A subset of the initial configuration spaces (left) and two examples of the group formation. The results from 642 different
initial configurations are visualized in the checker board. The white cell represents an initial configuration that leads to one entire group, while the
black represents one that ends up forming ostracism. The ratio of liking among people at t=0 is 1/3 and the parameter a= 1 is used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094333.g004
Figure 5. Influence of an philanthropist on the group formation. Except the philanthropist (a=0), other people maintain a=1. The group
configuration at t= 40 is used in the graphs. The results are based on 10,000 realization of the Monte Carlo simulation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094333.g005
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Conclusions
In this work, we present a simple model for ostracism formation.
It is argued that, as a fundamental desire of human, a sense of
belonging is what drives the coalition of the groups and moreover,
the occurrence of ostracism. A sense of belonging that an
individual experiences consists of two factors, the size and the
congruity of the group that he/she belongs to. An attitude toward
other people characterizes each individual and enables us to define
similarity between individuals. The congruity can be defined as
average of similarities with the group members.
Under the synchronized best response rule, people try to
maximize their sense of belonging. Sometimes the group size and
the congruity are competing and people need to keep balancing
between those factors. In order to raise the congruity, they may
start to cooperate in rejecting outsiders. This tendency is
accelerated as people gather more and more, eventually creating
divided groups. When the parameter a is 1 or less, people tend to
be generous toward those who are different from them. This
generally improves the overall size of the coalitions, but however,
still cannot prevent frequent occurrence of an outcast.
Alienating minority is a robust phenomenon in the group
formation and occurs even when there is a penalty for disliking
others. Since a target could be accidentally chosen with no specific
reasons, we can understand ostracism as an inherent part of the
group formation. We also study the influence of an philanthropist
on the group formation. A philanthropist is defined as a person
who pursue for mutual friendships with no condition. Irony of
philanthropy is that, while a single philanthropist substantially
improves a social integrity, he/she likely faces high risk of being
ostracised from the society.
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